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ZlomekFS je distribuovaný souborový systém, který umožňuje sdílet data mezi 
jednotlivými  uzly.  Tyto  uzly  mohou  spolupracovat  ve  několika  módech.  Tyto 
módy  se  liší  v  cachování  lokálních  dat  na  klientském  uzlu  a  způsobu 
synchronizace mezi klientským a serverovým uzlem. Tato synchronizace byla 
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síťového  spojení.  Současná  implementace  používá  FUSE  rozhraní  pro 
komunikaci mezi jádrem souborového systému a uživatelem. K synchronizaci 
dat  dochází  během  jednotlivých  událostí  vyvolaných  operacemi  nad 
souborovým systémem.
Pro funkci v moderním síťovém prostředí je nezbytné, aby komunikující partneři 
měli  jistotu  o  důvěryhodnosti  svého  protějšku.  Tato  práce  implementuje 
důvěryhodné spojení mezi klientskou a serverovou částí souborového systému. 
Navíc rozlišuje mezi klientem typu stroj a uživatel.
Další  důležitou  částí  práce  je  korektní  průběh  synchronizace  dat  a  přesné 
definování  sémantiky sdílení souborů.
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ZlomekFS is a distributed filesystem which is able to share data among nodes. 
These nodes can cooperate in various modes. Modes differ in caching of local 
data at the client side and in the way how data is synchronized between the 
client  and  the  server.  This  synchronization  has  been  implemented  by  an 
unsecured  and  untrusted  network  connection  until  now.  The  current 
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implementation uses FUSE interface for the communication between the kernel 
of the filesystem and the user. The synchronization is triggered when the user 
performs a specific operation above the filesystem.
For well  functionality in modern network environment it  is  necessary to both 
communicating partners to be sure about the identity of the second end of a 
communicating  channel.  This  thesis  implements  trustworthy  connection 
between the server and the client part of filesystem. In addition, it separates 
machine and user type of client.
Next important part of the thesis is correct data synchronization and precise 
definition of sharing semantics.
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1 Introduction
ZlomekFS  is  an  open  source  distributed  filesystem.  It  is  able  to 
transparently share data among oriented graph structure of nodes [1]. Data are 
organized in files placed in a directory tree structure and all standard POSIX 
operations are allowed above them. Main unit of shared data is called volume.
Volumes are organized in a tree structure. Each volume has one node, 
which is on the top of the volume's hierarchy.  This node must have its local 
cache, the source image of the volume, which is then modified by all nodes in 
the infrastructure. Connection between server and client has been implemented 
as insecure TCP channel until now. It means that there is no way how to check 
peer node's identity. In addition, the connection is susceptible to various types 
of  attacks.  These  attacks  could  result  in  stealing  or  modifying  data  by  an 
unauthorized entity.
The  filesystem  access  rights  management  has  been  designed  in  an 
extraordinary way. The filesystem has a mechanism which remaps users and 
groups valid at one node to users and group numbers valid at the distributed 
environment. This information is stored in a metadata structure which is passed 
through network with the content of the file. Then another node remaps them 
back to locally valid users and groups. At first sight it works well. But at second 
sight, when a user mounts volume, all content of the volume can be cached (or  
accessed) by daemon launched by the local user. It is because server does not 
check any permission to shared file. So anybody can connect to server with a 
program implementing ZlomekFS network protocol and access all data, even 
data which should not be accessible to them.
Next  important  issue  is  sharing  semantics.  When a  file  at  a  node  is 
opened, the data  contained in the file has some versions. Handling of versions 
is called semantics. One way, how to solve this problem is stateless semantics. 
Stateless  semantics  is  implemented  for  example  by  NFS.  It  means,  every 
operation above file is interpreted as atomic file open, the actual operation, file 
close [2]. But this approach to file operations is not transparent to an application 
working above the filesystem. For example the file can be removed (unlinked) 
by another application between two reads performed by the first application.  
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And there is not any way how to solve this problem without loosing the stateless 
semantics. Because the access to filesystem is stateless, number of opened 
filedescriptors can not be held to determine when the data contained in the file 
should be released.
To ensure transparency of the filesystem to higher layers, there should be 
a mechanism which correctly handles opened filedescriptors and performs open 
and close operations independently on other operations. But another problem 
lies here.  After  a  process opens a file,  then another  node can push a new 
version of a file to the node. It could result in strange behaviour when one part  
of  data is  read from one version of  the file  and another  parts  from another  
versions. This could not be a problem when it is desired behaviour. But in some 
cases it  represents  a  serious problem.  For  example,  when the file  contains 
some snapshot of data.
In the old implementation of ZlomekFS this issue is solved in a special  
way. When a node does not have local cache, the operation is performed on a  
nearest cache in volume tree structure. So this case is not interesting. But when 
a node has its own local cache, read and write operations differ. When a read 
operation  is  performed,  before  own  read  from  file,  the  system  tries  to 
synchronize the data at the local cache with the version at master. And when 
write is performed, no synchronization is done until the file is properly closed. 
This behaviour is useful when a file is shared from master to client node and the 
application expects this direction of data flow. But in other cases it could cause 
many serious problems.
But there exists a way how to solve this problem. Concurrent read and 
write operations at one node should not be treated in a special way, they occur 
in  all  other  filesystems.  But  when  a  newer  version  of  file  is  created  in  the 
system, it should become accessible to each process opening the file. But each 
already opened filedescriptor should point to the version of file that was present 
at  system when it  was opened,  and ignore  subsequent  updates  from other 
nodes. This semantics was described in [1], but the implementation did not work 
well. 
Next issue is that each file at ZlomekFS is represented by filehandle, data 
type zfs_fh. This filehandle describes how the file should be accessed, which 
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volume  is  its  volume  and  its  other  properties.  One  of  the  most  important 
property is i-node number, which is treated as volume wide unique identifier of 
image of the file in local cache. 
This way is correct because UNIX-like filesystems (e.g. ext3, ext4, etc...) 
always gives unique i-node number to each file created on it.  But metadata 
containing i-node number is exported to client. Then the i-node number is used 
as an identifier of the file, when synchronization of file is performed. In addition, 
the architecture of ZlomekFS does not permit updating filehandles shared with 
other nodes.
This  property  of  ZlomekFS does not  permit  changing i-node numbers 
during operations. Most important issue of this limitation, as described in [3], is 
related to the performance of truncating file to zero length while preserving its  
old version.
1.1 Goals
This thesis should describe and implement security model for ZlomekFS. 
This security model should describe the behaviour of server side and client side 
in all  possible scenarios,  including cached and non cached mode.  It  should 
differ operating mode when the client application is launched by a single user or  
when it is a trusted machine. In case of a trusted machine, the machine should 
have access to all data stored in ZlomekFS. A single-user instance should have 
access accordingly to his identity.
Next  important  issue  to  solve  is  session  semantics.  Current  session 
semantics  does  not  behave  coherent  when  client  or  server  write  operation 
occurs. This will  be  fixed so when one version of file is already opened at a 
node, all operations will be done above this version.
At last the old implementation contains implementation errors that affects 
the stability of all system. So this thesis should fix as many of them as possible.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 2 describes how identity verification and secure communication 
between nodes could be solved. It also shows how handling client type differs 
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and how user membership in groups could be solved.
Chapter  3  gives  an  overview of  session  semantics  and  shows  which 
advantages  and  disadvantages  possible  session  semantics  possess.  It  also 
describes chosen implementation including its properties and possible future 
enhancement.
The chapter 4 is about issues tied to capabilities and internal filehandles. 
Because of changes described in chapter 3, there apeared a necessity to fix 
some behaviour issues of capabilities. In addition, the issue of i-node number 
directly stored in filehandle is discussed there.
Also another minor changes to the architecture of the daemon have been 
done. They have been done because of fixing the stability of the daemon. The 
way how and why they have been done is described in chapter 5.
Because the changes in implementation require more configuration data, 
in  chapter  6  new  configuration  options  are  described.  Because  of  chosen 
security model, it is necessary to generate certificates for clients machines and 
users. Doing this is also documented here.
The last chapter 7 is aimed at evaluating results of this thesis. It  also 




As described above, the old implementation of ZlomekFS does not use 
any security model. When client connects to server, only a protocol handshake 
is  done  and  the  connection  is  already  usable  for  data  transfers.  Standard 
communication  protocol  through  network  is  connected  TCP  protocol  over 
sockets. These sockets can be created over IPv4 [4] or IPv6 [5] protocols.
2.1 Basic security issues analysis
First take a look at protocol IPv4. It is for now the most spread protocol. 
See its datagram format in Figure 2.1. The whole datagram is not encrypted by 
default because IPsec enhancement of this protocol is not its native part. Simply 
can be seen, many attacks can be performed to this protocol. The easiest are 
network  traffic  sniffing,  stealing identity,  data integrity change or  man in  the 
middle attack, when the basic networking set-up is done.
Network traffic sniffing can be performed somewhere on the network path 
between  connected  nodes.  The  attacker  only  listens  to  network  traffic  and 
decodes data transferred through network. This way he can easily read private 
content of files or directories in case of ZlomekFS. 
Stealing identity is very easy, too. The easiest way is running another 
instance of program implementing ZlomekFS network protocol at compromised 
Figure 2.1: IPv4 datagram
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node. This way attacker can read full content of any exported volume and in 
addition he can modify any data stored in such a volume. 
When  data  is  passed  through  network,  it  goes  through  it  in  an 
unencrypted form, checked only by checksum generated by algorithm whose 
only  input  is  the  passed  data.  So  any  network  node  present  on  the  path 
between communicating peers can modify data passed in a message and then 
count again its checksum. When a message modified in this way arrives to  its 
destination, there is no chance how to recognize its modification.
Attack man-in-the-middle is a special case of these attacks. Some node 
on the path between nodes behaves same way as the server for client side and 
same as the client for server side. So he has full control above data passed 
through network and can transparently modify or read them.
These  attacks  can  be  solved  by  using  IPv6  which  should  implement 
IPsec enhancement by default but, as written above, it is not as widespread as 
IPv4. Another solution is very careful configuring of network and implementing 
IPsec above IPv4. But it is a quite difficult activity.
And here is another issue: these solutions can lead to trusted machine 
and connection to it.   But we can not do any conclusion about the program 
launched on it. It could be a malignant program launched by an attacker. Even it 
can  be  correct  implementation  of  ZlomekFS  but  not  launched  by  an 
administrator. It could be launched by a common user. In the old implementation 
of ZlomekFS this instance of filesystem daemon have full  access to all  data 
exported by available volumes.
This could be a large problem. It is because in cached mode, all  data 
available at one volume is transferred to this node and it could lead to massive 
network traffic. Another problem rises when a user uses somehow changed or 
hacked program or launches proper implementation of ZlomekFS in debugger. 
In this case, he can access all data even the data that should be hidden to him.
Because of this, there should be a mechanism which recognizes type and 
identity  of  client  connected  to  server.  The  question  is  how  to  divide  and 
recognize  types  of  clients.  One  type  is  user  who  connects  to  server  and 
acquires data.  Data accessible  to  him should be only the filesystem entries 
belonging to the user or belonging to a group where the user has a membership 
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or public data accessible to all users. No other data should be transferred to 
such a client. On the other hand, there should be nodes which contain all data 
shared by volume.
So  basic  goals  in  the  area  of  security  are  set:  The  communication 
between nodes  should be resistant  to  traffic  sniffing,  data modification and 
man-in-the-middle attack. The communication protocol  should be resistant to 
basic  cryptanalysis.   And  the  identity  of  communicating  peers  should  be 
verifiable and, accordingly to it, only a limited set of data should be accessible 
to each node. 
2.2 Other security issues
Except the problems described above, ZlomekFS can be vulnerable in 
other ways. The biggest problem is local cache stored in filesystem.
2.2.1 Local cache
There are many other possible attacks to ZlomekFS. Very vulnerable is 
local cache containing data. When wrong access rights are set to the cache, 
unauthorized  user  can  access  these  data.  So  it  is  necessary  to  discuss 
managing access rights to local cache.
Next  dangerous  problem  could  be  the  presence  of  local  cache  in 
unencrypted shape on disk. Because when the disk is mounted under another 
system, the cache can be accessible to attacker. But this issue can be simply 
solved by the user. The user can place the local cache to a virtual encrypted 
volume, for example by Truecrypt [6].
2.2.2 Data in memory
Naturally, when the ZlomekFS is launched, its working set [] data is in its 
virtual  memory in unencrypted form. This can cause two problems. When some 
data is swapped out, they are stored in a persistent form. An attacker can read 
them from the disk when he starts another instance of operating system and 
then dumps the content of swap partition.
This vulnerability can be avoided by disabling swapping or some other 
way by encrypting swap partition for example by [7] or [8]. In this case there is 
another  problem:  how  a  and  where  store  key  for  encrypting  swap.  It  is  a 
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classical chicken-egg problem, But it can be also solved by, e.g., using a key 
stored  at  some  removable  device  or  by  using  the  biometry  of  user  (or 
administrator).
Another problem could be raw data in memory. Today attacks based on 
stealing data directly from main memory chips are known [9]. The design of this 
attack is in stealing memory modules from a running machine and their very fast 
cooling (e.g. by liquid nitrogen). When the modules are deeply frozen, they can 
hold data up to  several  minutes.  But this  issue is outside the scope of  this  
thesis.
2.2.3 Not solved attacks
 Another attacks can be performed to the shape of network traffic. When 
an attacker has permission to the network media connected to node, he can 
read raw data sent through the media.  When the data are encrypted in the 
correct way with a good encryption algorithm, it is supposed to be very difficult 
to restore the image of the ciphertext or the encrypting key [10]. But when the 
encryption algorithm is deterministic and known, the attacker can often easily 
restore for example the length of sent data. From the length of the data some 
conclusions on the type of data can be done.  In some cases this  could be 
undesirable property. This issue could be solved by inserting (pseudo)random 
chunks of data to output stream. But this solution could lead to high network 
traffic, so this question is not solved here.
Another  problem can rise  from the  external  behaviour  of  system.  For 
example the heat emitted by its components or the consumption of electricity 
can be a source of information about system activity. But these issues require 
much deeper analysis than this master thesis and do not represent a serious 
danger in planed filesystem use.
Next  some  conclusions  about  system activity  shape  can  be  done  by 
observing activity indicators such as hard disk or network activity LEDs. These 
indicators  could  be  affected  by  generating  (pseudo)random  traffic  or  by 
updating drivers of such devices. But generating additional traffic can lead to 
high  network  traffic  as  described  above.  It  stresses  components  and  could 
decrease system response time.
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Another serious issue is DoS (Deny of service) attack [11]. This can be 
performed by many ways. First aim is networking stack of machine. Solution of  
this is a part of the design of operating system, so it would not be solved in this 
thesis. An attack to network infrastructure is similar. Again it is out of range of 
this thesis. Next serious issue is sending not valid data to machine by proper 
client, e.g. when it crashes. This can lead to serious problems and crash or 
malfunction  of  node.  Some  steps  to  avoid  this  are  done  but  a  very  deep 
analysis and probably rewriting of a large amount of recent code and adding a 
large amount of  new one should be performed to be sure, this issue is not 
already solved. 
Last main area that could lead to DoS is wasting node resources. Some 
operations performed on node require system resources as memory or CPU 
time. It can lead to malfunction of the node or to severe slowdown of the node.  
The biggest problem is to answer how much resources one node could acquire.  
In distributed environment of ZlomekFS it is hard to say how much resources 
one node could acquire. Because when the net of ZlomekFS is formed by two 
nodes, the amount of resources available to one node differs to case when the 
root  of  a  volume  is  processing  peak  traffic  of  requests  from  a  very  large 
network.
Next it is important to realize how to manage resources in environment 
where  no  assumptions  about  nodes  availability  can  be  done.  Nodes  are 
connected  and  disconnected  more  less  randomly.  Even  a  node  which  is 
available for communication can disconnect because of lack of its own network 
resources. Some proposals how to manage this question are done in chapter 
4.2 but this problem is left open.
2.3 Possible trustworthy solutions
There are many ways how to check identity of the peer and/or encrypt the 
communication channel. The easiest way is assigning a key to each node and 




By using this  mechanism message trustworthy can be reached.  Each 
node gets a key which is used for message signing. Before sending through 
network  from each  message  and  the  key  is  counted  a  hash. The  hash  is 
appended to the useful data and this message is sent through the network. 
When the message arrives at the second endpoint of connection, the data is 
picked up from the message. Corresponding key is selected accordingly to the 
assumed peer. And the hash is counted from key and that data. The result is 
compared to the hash appended in message. When they are equal, it means 
that the message has not been changed during network transfer and the origin  
of  data  is  verified.  This  solution  introduces three obvious serious problems. 
First,  the data are sent through the network unencrypted, so an attacker can 
read  its  content.  Second  problem  is  distributing  keys  through  the  system. 
Because of preceding issue, keys must not be sent in unencrypted form through 
network.  Suppose  that  the  keys  are  sent  some  way  through  an  encrypted 
channel  but  before  owning  them,  it  is  not  possible  to  check  whether  the 
message providing key is  from a trusted source.  So there must  be another 
trusted  communication  channel  for  distributing  keys.  In  addition,  each  node 
should know keys for each other node which could connect to it.  But let  us 
suppose that this problem is solved. 
Then another question rises: should symmetrical or asymmetrical hash 
function be used? When symmetrical hash function is used, both sides use the 
same key for signing and verifying messages [10]. In trusted environment this 
would not  be such a serious problem. But  in  the environment  of  ZlomekFS 
where common users would have access to keys used by another nodes, it 
would lead to serious problem. Users could steal identity of other nodes.
So for this reason an asymmetrical hashing should be used. But here is 
one  serious  issue  described  above:  messages  are  sent  unencrypted  and 




This data hiding can be performed by message encrypting. This should 
work that way, one node before sending message encrypts it, sends it through 
network and the second side decrypts it. Because encrypting is view form set of 
plaintext to ciphertext and decrypting is view from ciphertext to plaintext and 
these sets have same cardinality for common algorithms (Blowfish, DES, 3DES 
[10]), another attack to this solution can be performed.
When data is sent through network, an attacker can modify the message 
and  this  way  the  image  for  decrypting  is  changed.  When  the  decryption 
procedure is performed, it does not recognize the message change because of 
the same cardinality [10].
For  this  reason,  a  technique  for  recognizing  such  attacks  must  be 
implemented. As described above, message hashing is suitable for solving this 
problem. So after encrypting, a signature will be attached to each message and 
it allows the second side to recognize unauthorized modifying of the message. 
Even the same key can be used for encrypting and signing.
But  this  solution  also  brings  problems  with  key  management.  These 
problems  are  the  same.  When  a  conventional  fast  block  cipher  is  used, 
decrypting and hash verifying keys must be distributed through system. 
2.3.3 Key distribution
As  mentioned  above,  the  key  management  is  a  serious  problem  in 
distributed environment. In case when each possible connection has two pairs 
of encrypting (and signing) and decrypting (and verifying) keys and the structure 
is a tree, it means distributing and sharing many keys. Undesired problem then 
occurs  when  a  new  entity  is  added  to  system.  It  means  distributing  its 
verification key to all its neighbours and backwards installing verify keys of its 
neighbours on it. When this minimalistic approach is done, it makes it difficult to 
dynamically change topology of the network.
Implementing a smarter key management would be a better solution. For 
example, public key infrastructure [12]. This key management is designed for 
using asymmetric cryptography. Each encrypting entity is represented by public 
certificate  and  private  key.  These  two  keys  are  closely  tight  together: 
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Transformation of message by one of them is reversible by transformation by 
the second one. In the simplest case the public certificate is used to encrypt 
data  sent  to  owner  of  private  key.  Let  us  suppose  that  this  operation  is  
irreversible, so the public certificate can be shared among all  communicating 
partners. It can be done for example during establishing connection. So when 
the message is passed to node, it is transformed by its public key (certificate), 
transferred to destination node and there again transformed by private key. The 
result of this transformation should be the original message. 
Another  important  property of  this  key management is  its  usability for 
digital signing [12]. When a message is passed from one node to another, there 
is counted a checksum by a known deterministic algorithm. Then the checksum 
is transformed by a source's private key and appended to message. When the 
message arrives to destination, the transformed checksum is again transformed 
by public key. From message data is same way counted hash and compared to 
result of transformation. If the message has not been changed, these two data 
chunks should be the same.
This  is  very  useful  also  in  key  distribution.  Suppose  that  exists  one 
trusted private key and its public certificate (call them A  and A ' ). Another pair 
of a private key and a public certificate ( B  and  B ' ) can be generated and 
verified their correctness. Then some special data can be added to B '  and a 
hash of this data object is counted. The hash is transformed by  A  and the 
result  is  added to updated  B ' .  Then the pair  〈 B , B ' 〉  is  assigned to some 
network entity C  and public key A '  is published. When any node D  connects 
to C , entity C  first sends to D  certificate B '  and D  can verify its correctness 
by performing procedure described above. 
This key management also allows creating trees of trusted entities like in 
the Figure 2.2. The root of this tree is called certification authority. Its special 
property is that its public certificate is signed not by a superior key but by its 
complementary private key. This key pair is then used to sign and verify first 
level of other certificates. These certificates can be user certs. It means, they 
are not  allowed to  sign other  key material.  But  another  can contain  special 
privilege and could be used to sign new certificates. Then after signing by such 
certificate, its verification certificate is appended to just signed entity. This way a 
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tree  structure  with  a  very  useful  feature  arises:  only  the  root  certificate 
authority's certificate is needed to verify any signed certificate. It is because first 
is verified first level sign. When it is considered trusted, it can be used to verify  
next level and so on.
2.3.4 OpenSSL
All these requirements are satisfied by X.509 standard [12]. This standard 
allows  hierarchical  public  key  infrastructure  and,   in  addition,  revoking 
certificates. It means that when a key is compromised, it can be invalidated. The 
invalidation is performed by a list of revocated certificates (let call the list CRL – 
certificate revocation list). This list is signed by certification authority. When a 
certificate is considered untrusted, its identifier is added to this list. Then the list 
is  signed by the certification authority and distributed to  all  nodes [12].  The 
distribution channel may not be secure because of signature of the list which 
provides trustfulness.
When  there  is  established  communication  channel  between  two 
endpoints, they show their certificates to the peer. The peer looks into the CRL 
and when the certificate is there present, it rejects further communication.






This behaviour is very useful in environment where it is supposed that the 
private  key  of  entity  can  be  stolen  or  other  way  compromised.  And  the 
environment of ZlomekFS where each user might have its own certificate meets 
these properties.
So there should be an authority: the administrator of whole system who 
will issue new certificates and also issues and updates the CRL.
Most common framework implementing the X.509 standard is probably 
OpenSSL [13]. This protocol can be set above TCP/IP protocol, so there are 
necessary only minor changes in the old implementation. But OpenSSL is not 
only a layer providing authentication of communicating nodes. It also encrypts 
the  connection  between  nodes  by  cryptographic  communication  protocols. 
Available protocols are  SSL v2, v3 and TLS v1 [13]. These protocols should 
provide  enough  amount  of  security  for  purposes  of  ZlomekFS.  When using 
sufficiently long asymmetric  keys (for establishing of  connection)  – it  means 
about 2048 bits, the probability of compromising the communication  channel is 
very low for now [10]. In future, the length of this key will rise but it can be very 
simply replaced by another key.
Quite pleasant property of OpenSSL is the fact that it is not only a library 
for securing network connection. It is a complex package including many utilities 
for  managing  key  material  and  generating  support  files.  Because  of  this 
OpenSSL is a good choice for securing ZlomekFS.
When  X.509 format  of  certificates  is  used,  they can contain  another 
information about its holder,  issuer and validity.  Very important  entry is their 
period  of  validity.  It  is  very  unfortunate  solution  to  have  a  certificate  with 
unlimited validity period. It is because computers are still rapidly faster and keys 
providing enough security today will be totally obsolete after a few years (maybe 
earlier).
Next important entry is also identity of holder. From this  field, it can be 
get by trustful  way, who is the peer.  X.509 format also offers some optional 
fields, which can be used  to determine the type of peer node.
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2.4 Node types
As described in chapter 2.1, nodes created by single users can access 
only the data that the user is authorized to access. But when all nodes would be 
only user nodes, it would rise a problem: Each part of filesystem would have 
some data set but nowhere would be all image of a volume. So when another 
node (user) would connect, it would prove its identity but the data owned by the 
user would be stored at node with the same user identity. It would mean: all 
users should have their private data set in their own local cache and share only 
public data.
This approach does not meet the idea about distributed filesystem which 
has a master node where a user connects, downloads its data set, works on it 
and then stores  the  data  back  to  the  repository.  Some time later  again  he 
checks out all data set from another node and can continue his work.
So there should be some entities which contain all data. But as discussed 
above, it should be not the user. So it is necessary to involve another type of 
node trusted to contain all data.
2.4.1 Machine type node
As any other process, the instance of ZlomekFS daemon on a machine 
type node has to run under a UNIX user account, and the question is which 
one. One of the solution is introducing special users whose task is just storing 
data into the cache. It would prohibit access to data in the cache by other users. 
But here is another problem. The mechanism of storing file metadata is solved 
in a quite specific way. When the file is created, its owner uid and gid [1] are 
translated to systemwide known numbers, stored to metadata of this file and the 
file is stored to local cache under its permissions belonging to its creator. 
This  method has  one serious disadvantage.  In  case  that  instance of 
ZlomekFS manages files belonging to another user, the mechanism of saving 
file access rights does not work. It is because of changing access rights to file 
the process must have appropriate privileges [14].
Also here is another way how to treat this issue. It can again be done by 
defining a special user and group where this user belongs to. But in this case, 
all local cache would belong to that user and all operation above access rights 
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would be redirected from filesystem to metadata. But this solution requires a 
very deep change of the old implementation of ZlomekFS. More or less it would 
mean the change of all FUSE interface.
Another solution is launching the daemon of ZlomekFS as a superuser or 
another user which is allowed to change privileges of files. In this case it would  
be good to declare the whole machine and any operation done by it does not 
have to be checked when propagated to another machine.
It is because the type of installation. In the case the user connects the 
client to ZlomekFS infrastructure, he has his own certificate and possibly his 
own implementation of ZlomekFS daemon. But when the daemon is launched 
under  a special  user  which is  created (or  another  way trusted)  by machine 
administrator, the administrator can do steps to avoid stealing its identity. For 
example storing keys in a secure location.
This  approach  also  has  another  important  advantage.  When  FUSE 
filesystem  is  launched  under  superuser,  the  option  allow_other can  be 
passed to it. In this case the content of ZlomekFS will be accessible to all user 
under proper access rights. It is possible to pass argument allow_other even 
in common-user mode, but it requires changes in  the  /etc/fuse.conf [15] 
and they are systemwide valid. So this way would affect, probably undesired, 
behaviour of the whole system.
Here a question arises how to differ the described type of node from the 
node created by a root at a machine for his own purposes. In addition there 
would be another undesired property: the root could be mapped to a common 
user  at  ZlomekFS  infrastructure,  so  each  connection  would  require  a 
mechanism how to ensure that peer is really machine's superuser.
Much better solution is using certificate data fields to store information 
about the type of node which owns it. So now at least two types of certificates 
are needed. One for fully trusted machines and one for individual users. Here is 
a question whether another type of certificate would be needed.
It is sensible to expect that these two cases are extreme. A smaller unit 
which can get access rights could be defined as an intersection of directory tree 
and user's access rights. But this way have not any benefits. Similarly larger 
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units than one machine need not to be considered, too. So the last question is 
whether  there  is  an  entity  which  might  be  important  and  is  not  user  nor 
machine. But ZlomekFS and FUSE are designed for two basic purposes: to 
mount  filesystem  for  one  user  and  nobody other  can  reach  it  or  to  mount 
filesystem for  all  users at  a system level.  So no other  entity should not  be 
introduced into the infrastructure of ZlomekFS.
This solution brings one important property of ZlomekFS: the shape of 
infrastructure tree is more precise showed in Figure 2.3. The root and non-leave 
nodes should be trusted machines with all data accessible. Leaves of the tree 
are nodes which can be common users or fully trusted machines. And there 
should be a mechanism which prohibits connection of node to an instance with 
user privileges because only incomplete set of data would be accessible. O n 
the  other  hand,  there  can  be scenario  where  a  user  mounts  his  data  at  a 
“router”  which is connected to a ZlomekFS infrastructure. Then he connects 
another local node to such a “router”. Then from the architecture of ZlomekFS, 
there would not be a problem. But because because this this approach would 
lead to major architecture changes, this behaviour is forbidden.











2.4.2 User mode connection
As described above, these nodes are placed as leaves in hierarchical 
structure of ZlomekFS. They are intended to make accessible private data to 
each user. They are intended to work in cached or non-cached modes.
When  such  a  node  connects  to  server,  it  proves  its  identity  by  a 
certificate.  Then every operation required by such a client is verified by the 
server. The verification includes file permission check. When access rights to 
file allows desired operation, it is done, in another case it is rejected.
Here rises another problem: what about files that have executable bit set 
but read bit not set for that user. The user is allowed to execute such files but 
for  executing  the file  should  be transferred to  a client  node.  But  when it  is 
transferred this way, the data of the file can be stored also at that machine. It  
means that the content of such a file can be compromised by that user. But here 
should  be  a  way how to  launch them.  This  requirement  leads  to  a  special 
limitation. When a user wants to launch an executable file form, a node with 
only user certificate, he also should have the permission to read that file. This 
solution differs from the standard behaviour of POSIX system but in order to 
prevent compromising data it is necessary.
Another problem rises from the local cache access rights management. 
Files are also stored in underlying filesystem and their access rights are stored 
in it.  From discussion above flows, it  is  not  a nice solution to  transform file 
access rights directly from metadata to local entities.
But when a common user launches the daemon, it inherits his identity, so 
changing  owner  and  group  of  file  in  the  cache  is  not  possible.  The  only 
possibility  is  granting  CAP_CHOWN  [14]  to  that  user.  But  by  granting  this 
capability,  effective privileges of  that  user dangerously rise.  So in this  case, 
when using user-type of certificate, the executable of ZlomekFS should have 
set the setuid bit and should be owned by a user who is capable to change file  
owner.
At first sight, it should be dangerous, to launch such a large project with 
superuser privileges. But this problem can be simply solved with a chroot utility.  
The ZlomekFS own daemon will be stored without the  setuid bit enabled. But 
another utility, call it zfs_launcher has this bit enabled. So when it is launched, it  
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again  creates  command  line  accordingly  to  arguments  passed  to  it  and 
launches ZlomekFS with chroot somewhere in user's home directory. 
In case the implementation of ZlomekFS does not contain a fatal bug, this 
should prevent  possible  attacks to  local  system. A fatal  bug is  a  bug which 
allows replacing the code of running program by a harmful code. This attack, 
called  stack  overflow,  is  performed  by  sending  data  of  wrong  length  to  a 
program input.  But OpenSSL is used for network communication and all buffers 
are well bounded. File inputs are again bounded. It is important to prevent stack 
overflow. Because when it happens, the chroot jail  can be broken [16]. So if 
these conditions are met, there should not be done an attack dangerous to all  
system to ZlomekFS daemon when it is placed out of root directory. 
2.4.2.1 Group membership
The user is always a member of a group, sometimes not only one group. 
So here rises a problem how to manage mapping group membership of a user. 
It is because at one machine, the user can be a member of a set of groups, but 
at  another  machine,  he  can  be  a  member  of  a  different  set  of  groups.  In 
addition, there is a possibility that, at a node, there does not exist mapping from 
systemwide group to local group.
This issue can be solved in many ways. One of them is restricting the 
user membership at all  nodes connected to ZlomekFS. This approach is not 
scalable. Any group membership change at one node should be propagated to 
other nodes before the user connects there. In addition, it is not transparent to  
nodes'  administration  because  there  should  be  some  restrictions  to  group 
membership  at  some  nodes.  Simply  said,  the  environment  may  not  be 
homogeneous. 
So another solution should be chosen. It could be based on information 
about  group  membership  present  in  data  used  by  the  filesystem  and 
automatically spread. First such data can be certificates. The information about 
group membership can be stored in them. In real it means, the information of 
group membership can be stored in an entry contained in certificate in the same 
way as the user identity. 
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But when all systemwide groups would be stored in a certificate, it would 
bring many problems. When the group membership changes, a new certificate 
must be issued. In addition, the old certificate must be revoked. So this way is 
not the best. A better solution would be storing group membership information in 
a  separate  file  stored  and  distributed  by  filesystem.  These  files  should  be 
accessible by all nodes but changeable only by administrators. For this purpose 
configuration volume [1] could be used because this volume has proper access 
rights:  Anybody  can  read  it,  but  only  the  user  mapped  to  ZlomekFS 
administrator can modify it. In that volume a file containing information about  
group membership could be placed. And the certificate may contain only an 
index to that file, which allows group membership searching. This solution also 
allows to have one  entry per certificate and the entry is not  dependent on 
machine  where  it  is  used.  At  this  machine  the  mapping  of  groups  is  then 
defined by its entry in the mapping mechanism.
The configuration volume also has another important property. When any 
change is performed on it, the ZlomekFS mechanism notifies all clients about 
such a change. When a change is reintegrated to server node, closing of that 
file triggers the same mechanism at its clients and further reintegration to higher 
levels of hierarchy is performed. This way important setup information is spread 
very fast through all infrastructure.
Next reason why it is a good way to treat this information is the fact that 
all information about ZlomekFS users, groups and its mapping is also handled 
this  way.  So  this  solution  is  logically  consistent  with  the  preceding 
implementations. 
2.6 Certificate revocation
Because  of  usage  of  this  system  by  many  user,  accidental  identity 
compromising can be caused. This can happen by losing user's private key. In 
case of a machine type certificate it is an extremely serious problem because 
the new owner of key gains full control of all data shared through the system. 
So here must be a mechanism of secure storing files containing key material. 
This  problem  is  solved  directly  by  placing  machine  certificate  to 
configuration  directory  with  special  access  rights.  These  rights  should  be 
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adjusted so that  any other user can not  reach that  file.  But here is another 
issue: storing of user level certificates. The user should be allowed to transfer 
his certificate among all machines that he can use.
This type of behaviour brings a higher risk of losing the identity. So there 
should be present a simple way how to invalidate X.509 certificate as  described 
above. The OpenSSL framework brings full support of these actions but another 
problem is how to distribute this information.
The simplest way is providing CRL with other identity data on startup of 
node. But this solution brings a problem how to obtain the CRL list. It would 
mean, before each startup the user should use a service (e.g. web or another 
maybe proprietary service) to obtain this list. Again, this connection should be 
trusted because in another case an attacker should provide obsolete CRL list. 
Of course CRLs also have limited time of validity, so this should not be such a 
problem. It is because obsolete CRL would be valid only for a short time. But in 
distributed environment of ZlomekFS when nodes can work disconnected for a 
long time, it would bring a problem. In some disconnected areas all CRLs would 
become obsolete and no communication could be performed.
Better way may be to generate CRL with a longer period of validity and 
distribute  it  with  data  of  the  filesystem.  But  again  this  solution  has 
disadvantages.  The  main  reason  is  when  a  machine  type  of  certificate  is 
compromised, as shown in Figure 2.4, all its subtree has a serious problem. 
Consider  a  situation   when  the  system  administrator  realizes  that  a 
machine type of node has been attacked and its certificate is stolen. So it takes 
root certification authority's key and compromised certificate and updates the 
CRL.  Then  the  CRL  is  copied  to  proper  path at  the  ZlomekFS  directory 
structure. There could be three basic types of node where this operation should 
be done as shown in Figure 2.4.
Suppose when a certificate is stolen, any assumptions about identity or 
correctness about that node could not be done.  Only in case when the CRL is 
updated at compromise node, the identity of the node is known, but still there 
could be a problem about the correctness of local ZlomekFS implementation, so 
it could be unable to share the CRL.
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When the new CRL is installed in the subtree where compromised node 
is root, it should by installed though that tree but it is only the first sight. The 
behaviour of such a damaged node is undefined, so it can update version of file 
holding CRL and this way cause a conflict.
A very similar situation is when the new CRL is installed from outside of 
such a tree. Again the malicious node can cause conflict and there can't be 
done any assumptions about sharing CRL through network. So this way seems 
not to be the best solution of the problem.
But there is not any other way how to obtain CRL. Only two types of 
communication channels are  available: by own ZlomekFS infrastructure or by 
another  channel.  Both  of  them have  similar  problems.  For  the  first  case  a 
restriction must  be defined.  Especially about  behaving and administrating of 
nodes with machine type certificate.
The  discussion  above  brings  an  important  result:  Distributing  CRL 
through  ZlomekFS  is  not  a  good  way  how  to  manage  revocated  machine 
certificates. But on the other hand, when an attacker reaches the private key of 
machine type node, it means that he has had access to secured store of the key 
material. But this may happen only when administrator's credentials are broken 
or the daemon is hacked. But in these cases the  validity of the local cache or  
data sent to other nodes can be corrupted and the topology of the ZlomekFS 
net  can  be  affected.  So  stealing  private  key  of  machine  key  is  only  a 
subsequent case of a much serious problem. And the solution of this is not only 
replacing the key with a new one and then to revocate the old one. First, all  
such attacked nodes should be repaired,  correctness of  installed version of 
ZlomekFS,  other  programs  and  settings  should  be  checked.  Then  a  new 
certificate for this node should be issued and the old one revocated. Finally, 
after  systemwide synchronization  of  CRL,  it  should  be  checked whether  no 
conflicts  occurred  and  the  synchronized  version  is  equal  to  just  declared 
version. Good news is that because of a high level of securing (described in 
2.7) machine mode nodes, this case should not happen.
But another case is user type node. The user takes his key material with 
them, so stealing it is not so difficult. But revocation of such a certificate is easy.  
Important  points  are:  the  client  mode  machine  is  a  leaf  in  the  ZlomekFS 
29
topology tree and it is typically not allowed to modify configuration data. In case 
that it  tries to do that,  reintegration of such a file will  be rejected by its first 
neighbour and systemwide settings will not be corrupted.
So when compromising of user type certificate occurs, it  is enough to 
generate new CRL and update the old one. The change will be spread through 
the  infrastructure  and  communication  channel  to  the  compromised  node 
disconnected.
2.7 Implementation details
The proposed improvements to ZlomekFS naturally requiree significant 
changes of implementation. The most important is the change in network stack 
of ZlomekFS.
2.7.1 Network stack
In previous implementation the networking stack was solved as a simple 
filedescriptor placed in structure fd_data_t. This structure was then passed to 
another  calls  and  native  POSIX  calls  were  performed  above  the  integer 
filedescriptor. Also as a side effect the integer nature of the filedescriptor was 
used as an index to field of structures fd_data_t. This is possible because the 
filedescriptor is a small non-negative number.
But when OpenSSL is used for securing network communication, it must 
be possible to manage network communication by it. There are two main ways 
how to solve this problem. One is rewriting all network module accordingly to 
OpenSSL requirements. The second is based on observation that OpenSSL is 
only a wrapper above sockets and provides similar functionality and even the 
calls are very similar.  So the network connection has been redesigned as a 
virtual  object  which  provides  all  necessary functionality  to  client  application. 
These functionalities are reading data, writing data to connection and support 
functions as binding, connecting and others. 
Because network connection is not now just an integer, but a dynamically 
allocated object, it must be properly deallocated when it is not further needed. It  
would be a simple operation in environment where only one thread has access 
to  that  structure.  But  ZlomekFS  networking  module  is  designed  to  be 
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multithreaded and this structure is shared between threads. So the technique of 
reference counting to object has been chosen. It is fast and reliable. When a 
thread gets pointer to the object, the reference counter is atomically increased, 
when the thread releases the object, the reference is decremented. When the 
counter reaches zero, it means no thread knows the pointer to it, so it is further 
unreachable and it can be deallocated.
Another  problem in  the networking stack has been statically allocated 
array field of  fd_data_t, which describes internally each connection. It  has 
been indexed by filedescriptors assigned by kernel. A nice solution would be to 
dynamically change its size. For this purpose the special indexing layer bound 
with network connection has been designed. But during a deep analysis of the 
module important findings were made. Not only filedescriptor is passed to other 
thread but just pointer to all structure fd_data_t. So here could be done two 
decisions. The first one is passing  a copy of the structure. But the structure is 
designed for data sharing between threads and copying of  it  would lead for 
example to problems with synchronization. It is because it contains a condition 
variable to manage threads using this structure. And pthread entities should not 
be copied [17].
The second way is to hold only pointer in the field to the  fd_data_t 
structure. But it introduces the necessity of using another reference counting 
and another synchronization in network module. The reference counting can be 
solved simply but after analysis of locking scheme of all ZlomekFS daemon, it  
was  considered  to  leave  the  old  implementation  of  managing  connections 
untouched.  It  is  better  to  waste  a  few  kilobytes  of  memory  then  to  risk  a 
deadlock.
The next necessary problem described above is the secure storing of key 
material. Especially the machine type key is very vulnerable. So it should be 
stored in a secure place. There were considered many ways of placing this 
data. But because of decreasing dependence on other services, storing in local 
filesystem has been chosen.
Because of this, access rights to configuration files should be precisely 
checked. When the ZlomekFS daemon is launched, it checks access rights to 
31
files containing key material.  These files should be owned by the user  who 
launches the  daemon and  access  rights  should  permit  at  least  owner  read 
access to it. All other rights should prohibit access by group or other users to 
them. In other cases the daemon will exit.
2.7.2 User mode launching
In the old implementation the way of treating local cache, even then in 
user mode, should be the ZlomekFS launched with superuser privilege. But it 
would mean possible security violation. Therefore some steps to avoid such 
possibilities must be done.
The most important thing is to avoid possible operating system data and 
configuration change when the process with superuser privileges is running. So 
the possibility of launching the daemon in chroot jail [14] seems very interesting. 
It means the virtual filesystem image is created at a filesystem point. At such 
point any program is then launched and its root of filesystem is just there and it 
can not affect other parts of filesystem.
Other possible way is to drop the privileges of running daemon. It could 
be done by changing the owner of the daemon from  root to another user. The 
best choice would be special dedicated user  zfs_user which will be created 
during system installation. And then the daemon will be launched with privileges 
of this user.
This  approach  brings  new  problems  to  solve.  When  such  a  process 
would  be launched,  it  can not  change directly  permissions  to  a  file.  It  is  a 
problem with the old implementation of cache when access rights are directly 
stored in underlying filesystem. This issue can be solved in two ways. The first 
one is  granting   CAP_CHOWN privilege to  the  daemon.  But  this  would  be  a 
serious  security  issue  because  when  a  process  has  this  privilege,  it  could 
behave similarly to a superuser process when it changes owner to himself and 
then change the file.
The  second  way  is  to  discontinue  the  way  of  storing  attributes  at 
filesystem level and store them somewhere else. The best way is probably to 
store them at metadata information and leave files at cache under full control of 
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the daemon. Because of the possibility of  creating special  files,  the process 
would have granted privilege  CAP_MKNOD. 
This way would solve the main security issue. On the other hand, it would 
be nice to prevent the daemon to access another data when it gets corrupted.  
This can be done by moving it to a jail [14].
But  this  feature  of  UNIX  systems  (especially  Linux)  has  some 
disadvantages. The most important is the fact that all files, including libraries, 
used by such a program must be copied to the place where the root directory of  
the jail will be.
First of all, access rights to the root of jail should be changed to 0500. It 
is because its owner should have read  and write access to it. Then required 
libraries and configuration files should be copied to the  jail. So for doing this, all 
directories except the /etc and /var are removed from the jail and replaced 
by new. It is because ensuring correct behaviour of the launched daemon. The 
/var directory is left untouched because it is supposed that the cache will be 
placed there. And similarly the /etc contains important setup of the daemon.
Other issue closely tied to the previous one is the necessity of presence 
of  all  character  devices used by such a program.  So first,  there  has to  be 
prepared the environment of the jailed process. But in this environment even 
some special devices from directory  /dev must be present. But it can be a 
problem. This directory is mounted as another device, so making hard links to 
desired devices is not possible. When symbolic link is made to /dev/fuse, it is 
only a path to a file out of chroot, so it is unusable.
Another  way  how  to  provide  special  devices  to  the  jail  has  to  be 
performed.  The  problem  can  be  solved  by  mount utility.  It  can  mirror  any 
directory to a mountpoint when the option bind is specified. But just mounting 
all /dev directory to the virtual filesystem would not be a good choice because 
the daemon will be able to access all devices. So there should be created a 
subdirectory zfs_fuse_dev where hardlinks to needed devices will be present 
and this directory will be mount to the /dev directory in the jail. The command 
used for this is:  #mount -o bind /dev/zfs_fuse_dev/ ./dev/ .  The 
FUSE daemon can be launched at the jail now. 
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It is important to say that the utility preparing the jail must have superuser 
access rights again. This can be ensured by a SUID bit attached to it. It would 
not be a problem because the code of this utility is very simple. 
But another issue should be solved. How to behave when the user wants 
to place local cache somewhere else than the /var directory. This problem is 
very simply avoided by forbidding placing the cache somewhere else in the user 
mode. It is possible, that all daemon is launched in a jail, which is prepared by 
a privileged process.
2.7.3 User and machine mode 
New scheme of behaviour when the client is trusted machine or not fully 
trusted user has been introduced. This has brought also a new code inserted to 
the network module.
Types of certificate are recognized by field nsComment. A machine has 
its  value  set  to  string  ”Machine  certificate”  and  a  user  to  ”User 
certificate”. Accordingly to the value of this field the access rights check is 
then launched when an action is performed remotely.
But for doing so, there must be implemented a mechanism which allows 
mapping users to groups independently to local machine settings. It  is done 
quite simply by the configuration file and data held in certificate.
When  the  type  of  certificate  is  ”User  certificate”,  it  also  holds  the 
systemwide number of the user in field subjAltName. But this is too small to 
hold  all  information  about  user's  identity.  From the  user  type  certificate  the 
group membership information about that user should be also available. 
Here  are  two  basic  approaches  to  this  issue.  One  is  holding  all 
information  in the certificate. But it means to issue a new certificate for each 
group membership change and to revoke the old one. This means the necessity 
of a sometimes massive communication between the system administrator and 
the user and to manipulate with vulnerable key material.
Because  of  this,  a  better  solution  would  be  a  table  indexed  by  user 
systemwide ID and containing the membership information. This configuration 
file is designed as line oriented. Each line contains user identification followed 
by the list of systemwide identifiers of groups. This file is stored at configuration 
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volume, so it can be changed whenever it is needed and is also available to all  
nodes.
2.8 SSL utilities
Because the filesystem uses SSL framework for communication, it is very 
easy to use this package of utilities to manage key material. To be user friendly,  
shell scripts for certificate management are provided with the filesystem. 
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3 File sharing semantics
Each  filesystem should  have  well-defined  rules  regarding  propagating 
changes to its files. These rules can differ in many ways. As described below, 
there  are  several  issues  in  a  distributed  environment,  where  no  serializing 
authority  is  present  [18].  One  of  the  most  common  network  filesystems  is 
Network File System.
3.1 NFS [2] overview
This filesystem has been designed at 1980's by Sun Microsystems. There 
have  been  published  three  newer  versions  which  differ  from  the  old 
implementation. But the main importance of NFS is in its old versions which use 
stateless semantics.
It means the system itself does not have any mechanism dependant on 
client  connection.  It  is  because it  is  divided into  two main parts:  the mount 
daemon and the actual NFS implementation. When the client mounts a NFS 
volume, it first asks the mount server for a handle of entry point to the NFS 
volume. Of course, it should provide its credentials to the mount server.
When the handle to the entry point is provided, the client can use it to 
obtain handles to its child directory entries and so walk through the directory 
structure. But this handle is not only resource for walking the directory structure,  
it is also used for identifying files. It has the same functionality as filedescriptor  
in  local  filesystem.  Reads  and  writes  to  NFS  are  identified  only  by  this 
handle [2]. It means no explicit open or close to NFS filesystem is required. So 
when the client application does such an operation, it is ignored by server and 
always succeeds. Any subsequent reads and writes are done above actually 
closed file.
Requests to these operations are delivered to NFS server and here the 
file operations are atomically done. Each operation is interpreted as open, the 
actual  operation  and  close.  When  client  realizes  that  the  operation  failed 
because of a network error or a server malfunction,  it  can retry the operation 
until it succeeds. These operations work fine and the semantics is well defined. 
But the protocol has also disadvantages.
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Because it is stateless, the server can not count references to the opened 
files. It means such sequences of operations like open file, unlink the file from 
directory structure and using it as a hidden storage do not work. 
Quite similar is the case when a file is opened by a privileged user, then 
process  drops  its  privileges  and  can  work  with  that  file  is  quite  similar.  In 
addition, the NFS can have only one cache (in this case image would be better  
name), which is in the root of  its topology and other NFS servers then only 
redirects.
But  in  NFS  such  problems  can  not  be  conflicts.  It  is  because  all 
operations are done above one systemwide image of filesystem. So when an 
operation succeeds, it should be persistently stored in the filesystem. And when 
another operation is done concurrently, there are only two possibilities: they are 
not mutually exclusive and both succeed or one of them fails.
3.2 UNIX semantics
This semantics is designed for  local  filesystems where the kernel  can 
synchronize  each  operation.  This  filesystem  has  states.  Each  file  before 
accessing  must  be  opened.  Process  which  has  opened  the  file  gets 
filedescriptor which internally represents the file.
At this moment, the process has access to that file independently on any 
access rights changes. Even the file can be unlinked from directory structure 
but process which have opened filedescriptor to such a file can work with it 
independently on directory structure changes.
All operations above such a filesystem are synchronized by the kernel of 
underlying  operating  system.  It  is  because  at  one  machine  synchronization 
entities are effectively implemented. Because of this concurrent accesses can 
not occur. Suppose we have multiprocessor system where two processes try to 
access (for example write) a file at one time. The underlying operating system 
cooperatively with hardware ensures, that one access is done before the other. 
So modify-modify conflict [1] can not occur here.
The same case is create-create conflict [1] because it is same as modify-
modify  conflict,  only  above  a  file  with  directory attribute.  It  is  the  same for 
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attribute-attribute conflict [1]. Modify-delete conflicts []1 are again not possible 
here because of counting references to open files as described above.
This  semantics is  perfect  for  handling  files  but  it  requires very strong 
resources: synchronization entities or another scheme to avoid conflicts. And 
this entities are hard to implement in distributed environment [18]. Mentioned 
algorithms work well in a relative stable environment. 
3.4 Immutable files [18]
Some filesystems use a special way for accessing files: immutable files. It 
means that no write operation is permitted to a file. File is always created with 
all data and it can be further modified. 
When the file should be modified, all its data must be stored somewhere, 
the file is then removed from directory structure and new file is created instead.
3.5 Session semantics
This semantics again uses open and close operations to get capabilities 
to  a file.  In  its  pure shape it  says  that  when one process opens a file  and 
modifies it, the modifications are not visible to other processes which have this 
file opened. This allows one important feature: processes if they have their own 
copy of file, do not need to communicate. They only play with their data and in  
the end,  they close them.  After  closing all,  following opens should see the 
modified version of a file.
This feature means that changes should be propagated to other nodes 
after close and only then all  following opens should see this version. But all  
current opens should see their older version of file.
3.6 Comparison of these semantics in the context of ZlomekFS
ZlomekFS  is  designed  as  distributed  filesystem  with  maximal 
transparency of operations above it. It means that the operations should behave 
as similarly to operations performed above local filesystem as possible.
It means  that such semantics as  immutable files is not the best way to 
solve  this  problem.  Of  course  there  is  a  way  how to  make  this  semantics 
transparent to client application. It is briefly described in section 3.4 but there 
that  way  needs  serious  implementation  optimizations  to  be  usable  in  real 
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environment. These optimizations are based on reusing data stored at physical 
storage.
stateless NFS protocol also provides interesting semantics. But in its pure 
form, it has only one image and all  operations are serialized to that storage. 
When it is desired to some nodes have their own cache, it means conflicts can 
occur.  Because  the  lack  of  open  and  close  operations,  synchronization 
operations must be done during other filesystem operations. But they do not 
define a consistent state of the filesystem. It is not always such a problem but 
restrictions based on its statelessness do not confirm to the requirement to be 
transparent as much as possible.
Unix semantics seems to be the best solution. But on the other hand, it 
requires a mutually exclusive mechanism to serialize operations. Some of these 
mechanisms  are  described  here  [19].  But  all  of  them  have  one  strong 
restriction. When the node wants to write, it must be connected typically to a 
significant part of all network. So the possibility of implementing this semantics 
mentioned here [20] is at least very restrictive.
It  means that all  nodes should be tightly connected and when a node 
wants  to  write  to  a  file,  it  must  obtain  capability  to  write  from  a  granting 
mechanism.  After  finished  writing  it  should  return  the  capability  and 
simultaneously to returning the capability changes should be replicated through 
all network. This access does not solve synchronization of reading. But it is not 
a problem because read own writes semantics [21] at a node is granted by own 
operating system. And a read operation done concurrently to a write is not a 
problem  because  when  such  collision  is  done  at  local  machine  by  two 
processes,  the  kernel  always  can  schedule  the  reading  process  before  the 
writing process.
The only problem would be the case when processes on different nodes 
perform network communication based on data read from filesystem. Then one 
process can read newer data than the other. At this case this semantics is not 
transparent. It is not hard to see the only solution of this problem is to succeed 
write only after successful installation of new data by all nodes. But this breaks 
one of the basic paradigms of distributed computing: There should not be done 
any expectations about speed or liability of a communication channel. But for 
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data sharing between processes at one machine, it would be the fastest and the 
most transparent solution.
Last  considered semantics is the  session semantics.  It  mandates that 
only committed data are shown to other processes. Consider that the process in 
definition in section 3.5 is a node. It means there are special commit operations 
at that node, which shows internal changes to other nodes.
These operations should be the close actions of each process launched 
at node. It is because it is a way to say that the process has done some amount  
of work and has finished for now. 
This feature brings the possibility of operation conflicts when writes are 
not visible to other nodes immediately. On the first sight, it could be a problem, 
but  on the second sight,  this  property allows to  replicate changes gradually 
through all hierarchy of network. It is because this semantics allows concurrent  
(in the meaning of parallel) writes on nodes (further discussion in 3.7) and no 
serializing authority is then needed.
So finally the conclusion is: for one node data sharing should be  Unix 
semantics implemented  and  for  communication  between  nodes  the  session 
semantics will  be  used.  In  the  [1]  has  also  been  done  discussion  above 
choosing, but it didn't determine how the semantics would be used. And finally 
the real implementation of ZlomekFS didn't support any semantics in its pure 
shape. It is really true that data reintegration to server node was performed at 
the file close. But this is only one part  of correct implementation of  session 
semantics. When a file has been read, the local daemon has tried to update it 
from its server. It  means  that the opened file has been updated during read 
operation  to  a  newer  version  than  the  version  that  was  actually  opened. 
Additionally,  the update has been performed only by comparing data directly 
placed in the server's  underlying filesystem.  Again these data has not  been 
committed by close operation. It has been only raw written data.  During  such 
update the image at server also could be changed by another subsequent write 
performed at  server.  This  action  has led  to  update  interruption,  but  already 
updated data has not been rolled back to a really existing version.
A  very  similar  situation  is  reintegration.  When  user  process  has 
reintegrated data to server, there has not been any mechanism which would 
40
prevent  rewriting  just  reintegrated  data.  But  what  is  worse:  this  way  could 
create a file containing more than one version of data when one process has 
reintegrated data and the other process has modified another part of file.
In the end it is important to notice that this semantics is usable for regular 
files [1].  For  other  types  of  files,  another  semantics  should  be applied.  For 
example named pipes or special devices should propagate all changes as soon 
as possible to other nodes.
3.7 Causality in ZlomekFS
We  define  causal  dependency  this  way:  If  exist  process  p  
where action b  depends on action a , written a → p b , then b  
causally  depends  on  a  ( a →b ).  For  each  message  m  
send (m)→ receive (m)  and  if  a →b  and  b → c  then  a → c . This 
definition works well in an environment where actions are done atomically at one time.
But  in  a  filesystem  like  the  ZlomekFS,  there  rises  a  problem.  The 
operation of modifying file could take quite a long time. It  is bounded by file 
open and file close. As described above, on file close synchronization between 
nodes is done. But synchronization information can be delivered to a node with 
three possible states of the file. The first is: the file is closed. It means no other 
process is using that file. If the version of the file allows reintegration, the file is 
reintegrated, otherwise [1] a conflict is created at client node.
The second case: the file is just open only for reading. If the version of 
server's file is in conflict to the version of the client file, again conflict is created. 
But when the versions do not prohibit reintegration, there is a problem. Because 
of chosen semantics, the file can not be blindly rewritten. When the file would 
be  treated in such a way, processes reading this file would have access to 
version of data which is newer than their opening and it s forbidden. Next, the 
conflict can not be created because there is no conflict in versions of the file. So 
the  readers  should  obtain  their  own copy of  the  file  and the  file  should  be 
reintegrated. Then any new reader will open the reintegrated version.
The last case is reintegrating to file which is open for modifications. The 
correct behaviour is not easy to  determine. When the file has already been 
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modified, the answer is easy: conflict. But the question is how to behave when 
the file is opened for writing and has not been written yet.
When  updating  such  a  file,  it  means  the  opened  version  would  be 
rewritten  without  any notification.  In  addition,  there  should  be a  mechanism 
which  counts  writes  performed  since  the  file  opening.  In  addition,  when  a 
process tries to open a file for writing, it can be assumed that it will write the file 
soon. Because of these reasons, the write operation is not only the event when 
the physical write  with version change occurs but it is the time interval between 
file open and close. So when a file already opened for writing is reintegrated, 
the conflict should be created at client.
But there is another problem with reintegration: when a reintegration is 
performed, the data could be sent to server in many chunks. This means that 
the reintegration is not an atomic operation. So between uploading the first and 
the last  chunk of data any other process can access the file.  It  means that 
invalid  mixture  of  versions  would  be  accessed.  This  behaviour  is  also 
undesired,  so  all  data (including  versions  from version  and  to version)  sent 
during file  reintegration are recorded to  a journal  and nothing else is  done. 
When the  client  finishes the  data  upload,  the  file  is  locked.  Then  the  from 
version is read from journal and compared to local version of that file. If they 
agree, the journal is traversed and all its content is merged with the file. When 
the versions do not agree, the journal is discarded and the client is notified 
about a conflict.  In the end, the journal is removed and the file is unlocked. 
When, for any reason, the connection between client and server is aborted and 
other process tries to reintegrate same file, the journal is removed and a new 
one is created.
A very similar case is updating file from a client to a server. It should be 
performed whenever a process wants to open a file. When the file is not opened 
at that moment, the behaviour is clear. The file is updated and the new version 
is opened.
When the file is opened only for reading, the reading processes should 
gain their own copy and update can be performed. But problem arises, when 
there is a process owning a capability allowing writing. According to semantics 
of reintegration it  means that the local copy of the file is in conflict with the 
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remote. So the conflict is created. But the question is which copy should be 
provided to a newly calling process. The blind following of semantics says the 
remote, newer copy but here is other important fact. The file could be used to 
data sharing between two or more processes, so opening of the remote link to 
the file would affect this important facility. So the link to remote file is added to  
conflict directory but the local version of the file is provided to callee.
Another  issue  is  tightly  coupled  to  the  strict  following  of  session 
semantics. It rises when the data source for update is required by another node. 
When  another  node  requires  update,  the  hash  result  is  counted  from data 
stored  directly  at  filesystem.  When  those  data  has  been  rewritten  by  any 
process  and  the  process  has  not  closed  the  file  yet,  the  chosen  sharing 
semantics does not permit to show the data to any other process.
This means another snapshot of such a file should be created when an 
open request is done to the filesystem (or at close operation). Then when an 
update request  is performed, the data should be always read from the own 
Figure 3.1: Reintegration ZFS semantics
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cache, when no write capability is present. In other cases, a snapshot should be 
available with correct data and will be then used as data source of data.
For better understanding of this implementation of this semantics, a brief 
conclusion of reintegration is done in Figure 3.1 (for update is similar).
3.8 Solutions
As described above, there are some required changes to the ZlomekFS.
3.8.1 Reintegration/update journal
Because  the  reintegration  or  update  are  not  atomic  operations,  as 
described above, there should be a way, how to make them atomic. Section 3.7 
describes  how the journal should work at all. But there are issues which should 
be solved.
The  first  is  the  place  where  the  cached  or  such  an  action  would  be 
stored.  There  are   several  possibilities.  The  first  is  creating  an  unnamed 
temporary file. But this solution would waste system resources because when 
the reintegration is in progress, the file should not be closed. Because when 
such a file is closed, it is also removed from the filesystem [3]. Then another 
possibility where to place this temporary file is  /tmp directory. But introducing 
this solution is another platform specific property of the project. So the best way 
is probably to be consistent with directory journal and place the file journal again 
to the metadata directory. This directory is not shared through the ZlomekFS 
infrastructure, so this could be a good choice. In addition the old implementation 
is able to build unique paths for files stored here dependent up to file's i-node 
number and device where the image of  the file  is  stored.  To recognize this 
metadata  file  from the  others,  the  suffix  must  differ  from  other  suffixes.  In 
addition, there must be a way how to recognize update and reintegration type of 
journal  because  they  can  occur  simultaneously.  So  the  suffixes  are 
.update_file_journal and .reintegrate_file_journal.
Another question to answer is the internal format of such a file and its precise 
behaviour  when  update  or  reintegration  abort  occurs.  The  main  problem is 
whether these files can have the same internal format. First, each case should 
have as first entry metadata describing the source and the destination version 
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of the file. This entry would be when the changes are commit whether the target 
file  has  not  changed  during  operation.  Then   reintegration/update  blocks 
themselves? should follow. The actual reintegration/update data has the same 
shape. It is always a block of data with specified length and offset where  it  
should be placed. Because of this, these  internal file formats can be the same, 
illustrated at Figure 3.2.
But there are more issues to solve. When a reintegration occurs, it can 
be interrupted by some cases. For example losing network connection. Then 
the orphaned journal should be removed and the reintegration aborted. But the 
implementation  of  ZlomekFS  does  not  allow  to  recognize  the  cause  of 
disconnecting. The connection can be aborted because of a serious network 
error or by a fully intended action and the connection will be  established again  
soon. Because of these reasons, there is no sensible way how to declare a 
reintegration as aborted. But when another reintegration from a node occurs 
and the previous node is disconnected, it can be assumed that an error has 
occurred. So the reintegration privilege is granted to a newly acquiring node and 
the journal is removed and started anew.














Of course, another case can occur. Suppose that one node is performing 
reintegration and has granted the reintegration privilege.  Then another node 
wants to perform conflicting reintegration. There could be three basic ways how 
to solve this.
The first  is  to  abort  the previous reintegration.  This  means that  there 
could  occur  a  starvation  problem.  It  means  that  many  nodes  would  try  to 
reintegrate  and  they  would  steal  the  right  from others.  The  second  way  is 
waiting for the result of previous reintegration. When its result is conflicting to 
the  waiting,  the  conflict  would  be  created.  But  this  solution  would  cause  a 
problem when the first reintegration runs for a long time.
So  there  has  been  chosen  the  third  way.  When  a  node  is  trying  to 
reintegrate a file already being reintegrated by another node, it probably means 
a conflict. It is because the reintegration changes the version of data stored in 
the  file.  And if  the  version  of  data  of  the  remote  version  of  the  remote  file 
corresponds to the local version and the remote file is being reintegrated, after 
commit the versions will not correspond. So in this case a conflict is created.
Another  question  is  whether  the  reintegrated file  should  be locked  at 
server. If yes, there is no possibility to change it but the reintegration can take a 
very long time, so it would case problems at that node. In addition, because of 
the  issue  described  above:  there  is  no  way  how  to  recognize  failed 
reintegration, the file could be locked forever. So the file should be locked only 
when the  journal replay is performed. The update operation is more less the 
same, accordingly to section 3.7.
3.8.2 Snapshots
As mentioned above, there must be a way how to store snapshots of 
files. The two basic ways could be used. The first is storing all the file how it lies 
in the filesystem. But this solution wastes the place on the persistent storage 
and,  in  addition,  such  an  action  would  be  very  slow.  Because  copying  file 
means its reading, and again writing all its content to the disk.
The results of [3] seemed very interesting. But in fact, it can not be used 
for  implementing  Unix semantics because it  forbids  reads parallel  to  writes. 
Access to files is treated in a special way. When a user tries to open a file for 
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writing but the snapshot already exists, the writing operation is rejected. But the 
idea of storing differential intervals of files could be a good idea. So the solution 
of creating snapshots is quite similar to the implementation of version system. 
As a result, it should not be exclusive to version system. These two accesses to 
treating snapshots should work together.
The idea is very simple. Every time when a special event occurs, a new 
snapshot is created. The snapshot is an empty file joined to an interval tree. 
Whenever the file is then modified, the modified interval is backed up and its 
boundaries are stored in the interval tree. When  the old version of data is then 
requested,  the  current  version  of  file  is  read  and  then  the  interval  tree  is 
traversed. If  there is an intersection between read interval  and data already 
backed up, the data is “updated” from the copy of the old version.
Another  interesting  case  is  when  the  source  file  is  then  truncated.  It 
means that all data contained in the truncated area must be stored to backup 
area.  This is very similar to the [3].
The important  question is  when the snapshots  should  be created.  As 
described  above,  such  events  happen   when  local  data  is   modified  by  a 
reintegration  or  update  (the  commit  of  such  an  operation).  It  has  been 
discussed that no writing capability should be present at the system at such an 
event. Then all  read-only capabilities should get assigned that snapshot and 
correct its readings by data of the right version.
But another event for creating a snapshot is required. Because when an 
update  or  reintegration  is  performed,  then  the  data  source  should  be  a 
snapshot. In other case the data of an incorrect version could be transferred. 
For reintegration it is not a problem because it is performed only on file close. 
But when an update is performed, it should be done above a version snapshot.  
As described above, the events when a snapshot for update should be done, 
are file closes.
When  later  a  data  update  occurs,  all  operations  are  done  above  a 
snapshot. At the end of update  file attributes should be also  synchronized. It 
means the snapshot should also contain  metadata of the file. And in addition,  
there is a question how to treat fisle attributes changes: whether the file attribute 
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change is a part of the sequence of operations, or it is a standalone operation 
which is able to start a new snapshot of  file.
The operation of file's attributes change can be understood in the same 
way as a commit of the current file state. So this operation would start a new 
snapshot for update of the file. On the other hand, this type of access would 
bring  a  new  type  of  conflict:  attribute-modify  where  one  process  changes 
attributes and the second data inside of the file.
But another issue rises from creating snapshots. There can be a process, 
which reads from a snapshot for a very long time and so the snapshot has been 
overlaid by many other updates and snapshots. In addition, there should be a 
way how to store many version snapshots. One possibility is to have a complete 
history of changes for each version used by processes. But when this way is 
used, it has many disadvantages: first, every change to current version of file 
triggers many data copies at underlying filesystem. It would mean a significant 
performance loss. The second is then significant disk space requirements.
Here can be done an observation: let have snapshots  a  and b  where 
version (a)< version(b)  then  all  changes  needed  to  reconstruct  b  from  the 
current version are subset of changes stored in the same way to reconstruct 
snapshot  a . In result the solution is quite easy. Whenever a new snapshot is 
created, then any older snapshot is closed and stored until any capability aiming 
to its version exists. 
When a read operation to a snapshot occurs, then all newer snapshots are applied in the 
order  they were created. Last, the snapshot of a specified version is applied and the read 
data should be in the correct shape.
From previous flows,  a good way of  storage of  snapshots is a chain, 
which could be traversed when searching the  correct version of the snapshot of 
the file. The schema of creating snapshots is shown at Figure 3.3.
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But a little problem occurs: when a snapshot for reintegration or  update 
is created, it would cause transferring all current read-only capabilities of such a 
file to a reading snapshot. But it would break the property of Unix semantics at a 
local node. So another flags were introduced: O_RUPD and O_RREI. When a file 
is opened In such a way, the new capability is created and the latest snapshot 
of  such  a  file  is  assigned  to  it.  This  is  a  safe  way how to  ensure  that all 
operations would be done above a snapshot and no other processes will  be 
affected by this behaviour.
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4 Capabilities and filehandles
As mentioned above, capabilities are used to determine which actions 
can be done to  the opened file.  But when capabilities are stored at  remote 
nodes, there is no way how to change data contained.  Even capabilities stored 
at a local node are hard to change. And as described above, there should be a 
way how to change them when a snapshot is created. It is because the version 
of snapshot which is tied to the capability should be stored in the capability. So 
there should be a mechanism which allows to change a capability  that  is not 
present at the kernel of the ZlomekFS.
4.1 Remote capabilities
There are two basic ways: to notify the client holding the capability, to 
change  it  according  to  the  request.  But  this  solution  brings  a  necessity  of 
network  protocol  changes.  In  addition,  it  would  be  necessary  to  send  this 
information in direction from server to client. And with the old implementation of 
ZlomekFS it would be a serious amount of work.
A better solution is to publish only virtual identifiers of filehandles. It could 
be only a large integer number followed by a bit-field which contains the access 
rights and finished with a field with a digest, which proves the validity of the 
capability.
When such a filehandle is then passed to the ZlomekFS core, first the 
digest is checked and if it does not seem to be valid, the operation is rejected. 
In other case, the capability identifier is then used to translate this handle to real 
capability which is then used to perform an operation.
4.2 Capability securing
The capability format, especially the level of securing, as described at [1] 
works  well.  It  is  because of  the known and trusted environment.  But  in  the 
environment where an attacker can impersonate a trusted user machine, there 
should be a way how to revocate an issued capability.
These  revocations  should  be  done  on  file  close.  But  when  another 
process has opened the file  for the same access right, the capability is shared 
among the processes. This means that just  one close does not remove the 
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capability  from the system, so another access via already closed file can be 
performed. It would be a problem in case when the file has been closed and its 
access rights  has been changed. Because of this each open operation should 
get its own capability which will be revoked at the corresponding close.
Even  these  requests  are  handled  by  the  mechanism  of  remote 
capabilities.  The  underlying  core  of  system  can  henceforward  use  the  old 
mechanism of  capabilities.  But  requests  performed  from the  outside  of  the 
secure  core  of  the  filesystem  have  to  prove  their  legitimacy  by  remote 
capabilities which are unique per open.
Therefore  there  should  be  a  mechanism  for  signing  the  remote 
capabilities in order to check their correctness. The old model of copying the 
random number hash from the capability holder is not sufficient. It is because 
the  MD5 has been used to count the verify.  This algorithm is very useful  for 
checking data for a random change but is not resistant to an aimed attack [22].  
Because of this an attacker could get the state of the internal pseudo-random 
generator. A better solution would be signing capabilities by SHA256 or newer 
algorithm.  But  signing  itself  is  not  sufficient.  The result  should be a field  of 
unique salt created by hash mentioned above and a real hash calculated from 
the content of remote capability and the salt. When the hash is calculated this 
way, the remote capability is valid even when its issuer has restarted, but its 
image does not exist. It is a problem that can be solved in two ways.
The first  solution is a persistent storage of capabilities but it  means a 
serious change of ZlomekFS daemon architecture. A better way is to add an 
instance  specific  value  (random  number)  which  would  be  also  an  input 
parameter of the hash. Then after restart of the daemon, all capabilities will be 
invalidated.  When a client  acquires an operation with  such a capability,  the 
operation is rejected with code CAP_OBSOLETE. Then it is up to the client how 
to manage this case. Whether to fail the operation or try to reopen the resource 
and thus  get a new capability.
4.3 Capability ageing
Issuing  capabilities  also  brings  problems  with  their  storing.  Each 
capability takes some amount of memory. So when too many capabilities are 
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present  in  a  system,  it  would  lead to  wasting  memory.  Here  are  two  basic 
possible approaches. One way used for example at [23] is to remember for how 
long an open file has not been accessed. And when the time goes over some 
boundary, the capability is discarded.
But ZlomekFS is designed to emulate local filesystem remotely and this 
solution is not transparent. Because at local filesystem, the file can be opened 
for any time and it  can not be closed by the operating system. To be most 
precise,  it  would  need  a  deep  analysis  of  times  when  the  files  are  left  
untouched.
Then  a  sensible  boundary  should  be  set  and  a  mechanism  how  to 
remove capabilities considered as unused should be implemented. 
4.4 Filehandle
As described at [3], there is a performance problem tied to filehandles 
implementation. The filehandles contain i-node number, which is specific for one 
instance of a file. But when a file is truncated its previous version should be 
stored and the simplest and fastest way is to move the image of the previous 
version to the version storage and then create a new empty file in the local 
cache.  But  the newly created file  will  obtain  a new i-node number and this 
operation will invalidate all filehandles held by other nodes aiming to such a file.
In addition, when a file is physically deleted from the filesystem, the i-
node is then again available for a new file. It rises a very serious issue. When a 
filehandle containing the i-node number is somehow cached by FUSE interface 
(or a client), then a problem could occur.
Suppose one process has requested a filehandle which is then stored at 
the  interlayer  between  FUSE  and  ZlomekFS.  Then  an  unlink  operation  is 
invoked.  It  successfully  removes  the  file  from the  filesystem.  So the  i-node 
number becomes available to a new file. At this moment a file creation can be 
performed and the file could get the same i-node number. Unfortunately such 
file can be a file created by another user and somewhere in the filesystem.
After these actions the first process holding already invalidated filehandle 
can try to open its properly gained filehandle. The i-node number agrees with 
the newly created file, so it is found in internal structures and the file is opened.
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This  issue  could  be  solved  by  introducing  generations  of  filehandles 
according to [1]. For better illustration the scheme of the filehandle is shown in 
Figure 4.1. But this solution is quite complicated and not very well extensible. A 
better solution would be assigning a unique virtual integer identifier to each file 
– internal ZFS i-node number.
This will allow to change the physical image of file without any affect to 
the  filehandle.  But  even  this  solution  is  not  without  any  problems.  Many 
operations are done in such a way where the i-node number of file in cache is 
got  by  calling  lstat call  and  then  a  partial  filehandle  is  passed  to 
lookup_metadata, which finishes the creation of the filehandle.
It  can  be  seen  that  all  ZlomekFS  is  internally  deeply  tight  to  i-node 
numbers  of  the  underlying  filesystem.  To  satisfy  such  requirements  of  the 
ZlomekFS, there must be implemented an interlayer which is able to assign a 
unique integer to each newly created filesystem entity and for all known old i-
nodes will remember the mapping of the underlying filesystem i-node number to 
the virtual i-node number of ZlomekFS.
4.4.1 Unique integer generator
So the solution is made from two basic parts: the generator of unique 
identifiers and the mapping interlayer. The question is how the generator should 
be  designed. Suppose the case where a client is tightly coupled with his server. 
It is the case of current implementation of ZlomekFS where a filehandle to a 










be only an atomic sequence number generator.  On the other hand, the last 
number sequence should be stored in a persistent storage. It is caused by the 
necessity of having for each file machine-wide unique identifier and after the 
restart of the daemon, the sequence must not be repeated.
So because of this, the sequence generator is designed as 64-bit wide 
unsigned integer which is shadowed to a persistent storage. So the question is 
where  the  integer  should  be  stored.  The  filehandle  also  contains  volume 
identifier which is used to determine which volume contains the represented file.  
So for such a file  the local storage of volume metadata can be chosen.
But when each file creation would generate an additional I/O request to 
local filesystem, it would mean an unnecessary significant performance issue. 
So the sequence generator should be represented by an object, which acquires 
an interval of values from the persistent storage. Then it assigns them just by 
in-memory  operations  and  only  when  the  interval  is  exhausted,  it  acquires 
another one.
4.4.2 I-node numbers mapping
However the described solution is just a part of a more complex system. 
Because of the issues described above, there must be present a system which 
does mapping from physical i-node numbers to the virtual i-node numbers. This 
can  be  done  by  reusing  already  implemented  structure:  hash_file. 
Whenever a new file is in the filesystem created, a virtual i-node number is 
acquired. Then  a pair which is inserted to the  hash_file is created from 
physical and virtual i-node numbers.
Then  when  any  ZlomekFS  procedure  requires  a  filehandle  from  a 
physical i-node  number, it asks for the virtual one. When it already exists, the 
mapping is found and the filehandle is ready for use. In case when mapping for  
such number does not exist,  it  is  created and such a file can be from now 
accessed by its physical i-node number.
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5 Minor changes
Except large changes described in previous parts related to data sharing 
and  network  security,  there  were  made  many  minor  changes  to  ZlomekFS 
daemon to improve its stability. 
The biggest problem of the whole implementation is the threading model. 
It is designed to allow massive parallelism, but because many levels of locking 
and unlocking, it leads to race conditions. Overall it is the source of most of  
stability problems. So some changes to locking schema were made with the aim 
to improve the stability but when a change has been made, another issue has 
raised. Many times the new issue did not relate to the new change. Just another 
race condition manifested.
But some minor changes have been made. The calling mlock procedure 
was  omitted  –  in  modern  system it  is  not  necessary and for  launching  the 
daemon under the account of a regular user it is unusable.
Next  the  problem  when  the  node  is  connecting  to  itself  has  been 
documented. When this situation occurs, a deadlock is created and all daemon 
is blocked.
By storing access rights in metadata there has been solved a serious bug 
in file opening. It occurred when a user created file with write only privileges and 
then the daemon tried  to  open it  (it  opens files with  read/write  access)  the 
opening failed – now all files at local cache are writeable by the owner of the 
daemon and belong directly him.
Another serious bug was wrong reintegration, when the file on the server 
was only truncated and the reintegration finished. This was caused by wrong 




The first step is to obtain source codes from the SVN repository placed at 
https://shiva.ms.mff.cuni.cz/svn/zlomekfs/branches/zaloha/stable and  to  install 
necessary libraries to  build  the filesystem. First,  the script  $./makeall.sh 
from the root of tree of source code should be launched. It will build all parts of 
the daemon. If this step is successfully passed, it is necessary to launch #make 
install. This will  install all  parts of ZlomekFS and create user  zfsuser and 
group zfsgroup to securely launch the daemon. During creating  the prompt to 
enter  zfsuser password is displayed. It is good to remember this password to 
administrate ZlomekFS without root privileges.
After  succeeding  this  basic  part  of  installation,  the  daemon  requires 
special setting up. Firstly, setting up and launching daemon for a machine is 
described. 
It  is  necessary  to  set-up  all  settings  required  by  previous  installation 
described in [1].  But  the SSL framework requires some other information to 
successful work. First, it is necessary to generate a pair of a root key and a  
certificate (if  it already exists, it  is necessary to convert the certificate to the 
PEM format and generate all user keys and certificates in the PEM format). This 
can be done by launching the script CA.sh placed in the directory ssl_utils 
in the root of checked out repository. The pair contains two files – the key and 
the  certificate  with  same  prefix.  This  prefix  is  passed  to  the  script  as  a 
parameter:
$./CA.sh prefix
If the certification authority is created, it is necessary to create a machine 
certificate. This action should be done by script  machine.sh placed again in 
the directory  ssl_utils,  the first  parameter is the prefix of  the name of a 
newly created pair of a key and a certificate, and the second parameter is the 
prefix of the name of the certification authority (it should be placed at the same 
directory from where is the script launched):
$./machine.sh new_pair ca_prefix
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The Creating of this pair  is necessary for each machine added to the 
ZlomekFS infrastructure. When these certificates are created, DH parameters 
and  a  random seed  should  be  generated.  It  should  be  done  by  launching 
special  gen_params.sh script  in  the   ssl_utils directory. Log in  as  the 
zfsuser and generate DH parameters with length 512, 1024, 2048 bits in files 
dh512.pem,  dh1024.pem and  dh2048.pem  and  random  seed  file 
rand.pem:
$gen_params.sh
Please note that while creating these files, some other files are created, 
so do not delete or modify them and do not allow any other users to access the 
directory where they are stored.
Next for all generated files the owner should  be changed to zfsuser, the 
group to zfsgroup and their  mode to 600 before installing them to their proper 
places (eg. /etc/zfs). The installation is then done by simple copying them to 
the destination. After having completed it, you should change paths aiming to 
them in  the  /etc/zfs/ssl_config.  Necessary  values  are  Localcert – 
path to   the machine's  certificate,  Localkey –  path to   the machine's  key, 
Verifycert –  path  to   the  certification  authority  certificate,  Password – 
password used to decrypt the local key,  dh[512|1024|2048] – path to the 
DH parameter files and seed – path to  the random number seed. Remember, 
the paths should be accessible for the zfsuser.
When these properties are set, it is necessary to create the certificate 
revocation list (CRL). If built in scripts for generating certificates were used, it 
should done by calling in the directory where the scripts are placed :
$openssl ca -gencrl -keyfile [ca_prefix]key.pem -cert 
[ca_prefix]cert.pem -out revocated.pem -conf Caconf.con
The  file  revocated.pem should  be  then  placed  to  the  root  of 
configuration volume. 
Finally,  the group membership file should be edited accordingly to the 
situation. It should contain at least one line. Its internal format is line:
user_id: group_id[, group_id[, group_id]...]
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Where all elements are integer numbers of ZlomekFS internal users and 
groups. When an access right check for a user type client is performed, the 
group membership of this user is read from this file.
Now the daemon can be launched as root and as parameter should be 
passed  the  mountpoint  where  the  infrastrucutre  should  be  placed.  When it  
starts, its access rights are decreased to the zfsuser:
#zfsd mounpoint
The last important thing is generating a new version of the CRL. It is done 
again  by  openssl  framework.  If  the  built-in  scripts  are  used  to  generate 
certificates,  it  should  be  done  by  calling  in  directory  where  the  scripts  are 
placed:
$openssl ca -revoke [bad_prefix]cert.pem -keyfile 
[ca_prefix]key.pem -cert [ca_prefix]cert.pem -config 
Caconf.conf
When the CRL is updated, it should be signed by the same way as the 
first CRL was generated and placed to the root of config volume.
The  setting  up of  user  machine  type  is  quite  similar.  But  because  of 
launching the daemon in a jail, it has some specifics. First, the certificate for the 
client should be issued. It should be done by calling
$./user.sh new_pair ca_prefix
It will create a new pair of a certificate and a key. During the creation you 
will be asked to enter a proper ZlomekFS user id of the owner of the certificate. 
It is necessary to fill it correctly because it will be used for access rights checks.
Then a jail should be created. It is a directory where the daemon will be 
placed. It should be in a directory where the user launching the ZlomekFS has 
write  access  and  the  ZFS-user  has  at  least  read  access.  In  this  directory 
directories var and etc should be created. In the var  the local cache of the 
created volume should be placed. Then the image of the /etc/zfs directory 
(including  all  content  needed  for  the  security  features)  should  be  placed 
somewhere.
Then should be called:
$zfsd_launcher config_dir mountpoint
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Where config_dir is the image of /etc/zfs and mountpoint is the 
mountpoint with absolute path (begins with /) from the root of the jail. After this, 
the ZlomekFS infrastructure should be created and mounted.
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7 Conclusion
The goals of this thesis have been mostly met. The security model has 
been fully implemented and seems to work well. The standard network security 
framework  –  OpenSSL has  been  used.  It  brings  very  high  security  of  data 
transfers and it is quite user friendly to an administrator.
It is now possible to logically divide the ZlomekFS infrastructure to fully 
trusted  machines  which  contain  all  data,  and  single-user  clients  who  are 
allowed to access only their working set of data. The resolving of their types is 
based on signed certificates, so it should be secure. In addition, there has been 
added feature of kernel check permissions, so now any user should not have 
access to data which doesn't belong to him.
This  thesis  also  considers  the  case  when  user's  certificate  can  be 
compromised,  so  the  possibility  of  revocation  obsolete  certificates  has been 
added.
The whole implementation of the network security framework has been 
done by an abstract layer, which hides implementation details from the rest of  
the system. Because of this, another implementation of network security model 
can be done without large changes of the current source code.
Fixing  the  file  sharing  semantics  has been implemented.  Not  only  an 
easy session semantics fix has been implemented,  but also new distributed file 
sharing  semantics  has been defined and implemented.  This  new semantics 
differs from the classic session semantics which says that  each opened file 
descriptor should have access to the version of file existing at the moment it has 
been opened. But when concurrent writes at one machine occur, the session 
semantics rule is broken and the second opening of the file should fail.
But the new implementation works with local files in the same way as 
Unix semantics until they are changed remotely. Then if the file is not opened 
for writing, and versions allow to do the change, it is done. Otherwise, in this  
semantics, it means a conflict has occurred and it is created.
A relatively easy but  very important  fix  of  abstracting filehandles from 
underlying i-node numbers has been done.  This  fix is realized by assigning 
unique  virtual  integer  identifiers  to  the  i-node  numbers  obtained  from  the 
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underlying filesystem. This patch allows performance improvement related to 
versioning, as described in [3].
The  last  goal  –  making  the  ZFS  daemon  stable  has  not  been  fully 
satisfied. Even more than one thousand hours spent by trying to fix all assertion 
aborts did not lead to success. It is because the very concurrent architecture of 
the daemon and quite confusing way of implementation where there are many 
levels of locking entities and operations are not fully unified to require the same 
level of locking. In addition, many functions called inside the daemon as side 
effect  unlock  some locks  dependently  on  satisfied  conditions.  So  fixing  the 
stability issues of ZlomekFS should joined with overall change of design of the 
application.
7.1 Further work
As described above, future work on ZlomekFS should aim at changing 
the locking model of all the system, unifying the requirements of locked mutexes 
of all levels of abstraction. Probably a good way to achieve this goal is to make 
the daemon less parallel and to reduce the amount of mutexes and threads. On 
the  other  hand,  the  main  ideas of  the  architecture  of  the  daemon are  very 
interesting.
Another required fix is implementation of access rights check for directory 
tree. At this moment it is implementable only for files cached locally. So when a 
node without cache is placed between fully cached node and leaf node with 
user level certificate, there is a problem: The node without cache can not check 
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